


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8 November 1968

BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT : Reconnaissance Requirements


REFERENCE: ADMINO CINCPAC Message dated 19 October 1968;
Subject: Same as Above

1. This memorandum is for information only. Attached are documents reflecting other United States Government Agencies' interest in photographic targets along the China mainland.

2. The Commander-in-Chief-Pacific, in a message to the Defense Intelligence Agency, expressed concern over the lack of acceptable photographic coverage of the China mainland and offshore islands. He further expressed his opinion that, due to the present stand down of other sources, that the IDEALIST is the best remaining source for collection of photographic intelligence in referenced area and can accomplish the necessary reconnaissance without overflights of the China mainland.

NAVY review(s)
completed.
NRO review(s) completed.

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3. Attachment #1 is a listing of the CINCPAC Intelligence Requirements Objective List that have COMIREX numbers. Attachment #2 is a listing of Intelligence Requirements Objective List without COMIREX numbers. Attachment #3 is a list of those CINCPAC targets nominated for priority three.

Attachments - 3
As stated above

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Attachment #1

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(INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE LIST)

RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS

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
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COMIREX NO.	NAME	COORDINATES	COMIREX PRIORITY	IROL PRIORITY
	Shan Tou Naval Base	2321N 11641E		
	Hai Men Shipyard (Shan Tou)	2312 11637		
	Ching Tao Naval Base	3604 12019		
	Ching Shan Naval Fac.	3609 12041		
	Shang Hai Naval Base (Wu Sung)	3123 12130		
	Chang Chi Army Bks S. AL-1	2343 11653		
	Chao An Army Bks AL-1	2341 11637		
	Wen Teng Airfield	3710 12213		
	Shan Tou A/F, N.E.	2326 11645		
	Shan Tou Boatyard N.	2322 11640		
	Shan Hai Shipyard Complex	3115 12132		
	Kao Chiang Naval Facility	3121 12132		
	Chieh Yang Bks & Storage	2335 11622		
	Kuan Chuang Tsun Shipyard	2952 12201		

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Attachment #2

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(INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE LIST)

RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>IROL</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>
Lien Yun Chiang Naval Base	3444N 11927E		
Shang Hai Motor Transport Area	3118 12129		
Shang Hai Iron and Steel Plant 2	3116 12131		
Kuan Chuang Tsun Naval Base	2953 12201		
Hai Men NVB & Shipyard	2312 11637		
Ching Tao Petroleum Stor. Area	3605 12020		
Shang Hai Pet. RFY, Gough Is. Area	3120 12133		
Shang Hai Pet Str Standard Vac. Oil Co.	3116 12133		
Shang Hai Pet. Storage Cathay	3117 12134		
Shang Hai Pet. Storage Upper Wharf Shell	3115 12132		
Shang Hai AD Sector Hq.	3118 12131		
Shang Hai AD Zone Hq.	3118 12131		
Chang Kuo Naval Base Shih Pu	2913 12156		
Lu Chiao AD Sector Hq.	2834 12123		
Hai Men Boat Repair Yard	2841 12126		
Mo Tao Tou	2827 12153		
Peh Shan	2805 12130		
Tai Chou Lieh Tao	2829 12154		
Hsia Men Boatyard	2427 11804		

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Attachment #2

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>IROL</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>
Hui An Airfield	2508N 11845E		
Chung Wu	2453 11859		
Kuan Tou Naval Facility	2608 11934		
Fu Chou Mil Hq.	2605 11920		
Fu Chou AD Sector Hq.	2605 11920		
Fu Chou Port Facilities, Nan Tai	2603 11919		
Nan Chi Lieh Tao	2728 12103		
Hai Tan Tao	2536 11949		
Nan Tai	2604 11924		
Tan Jih Tao	2511 11932		
Fu Yao Shan	2656 12023		
Lung Tien Airfield	2534 11928		
Shacheng	2711 12026		
Fu Chou	2610 11923		
Chieh Yang Grain Storage S.	2330 11620		
Ching Tao Port Fac. Inner Harbor	3605 12019		
Ching Tao Shipyard Pt. Base	3603 12019		
Ching Tao AD Zone Hq.	3604 12022		
Shanghai Thermal Power Plant	3116 12133		
Shanghai TPP Cha Pei	3120 12131		
Shanghai Port Facs Yang Shu Pu	3115 12130		
Shanghai Mach Tool Plant	3118 12133		
Shanghai Nonferrous Metals Plant	3116 12133		

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
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Attachment #2

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Attachment #3


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NOMINATED FOR PRIORITY THREE

NON-IROL OBJECTIVES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
Chou Shan Port Fac. W.	300N 12204E
Hai Men Pet. Products Storage	2841 12127
Chiang Tung Hwy Bridge ov/Chu Lung	2431 11747
Lo Yang Hwy Bridge ov/Tidal Basin	2457 11841
Shih Ma Port Facilities	2427 11749
Hsia Men Petroleum Products Storage Naval Base	2428 11804
Kuo Keng RR Yard	
Hsia Men Petroleum Storage Shell Oil	2427 11802
Hsia Men RR Yards	2428 11806
Chuan Chou Naval Base and Port Facility	2454 11841
Chiang Kou Hwy Bridge over Unknown Stream	2529 11912
Kuan Tou Port Facilities	2608 11934
San Sha Port Facilities	2655 12013
Wen Chou Petroleum Products Storage	2758 12046
Ma Wei Port Facilities	2559 11927
Fou Ting Petroleum Storage	2324 11643
Lien Yang Shu Hwy Bridge	2329 11646
Hai Men Port Facilities Shan Tou	2312 11637

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Budget Issue No. 2:

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The Phase II (both FY-69 and FY-70) funding requirements are under continuing review and refinement; however the dollars proposed may be reasonable. Note, however, that the Phase I program discussed herein does not include the operational employment as part, in the manner briefed, but only the one month flight test.

Note should be made, also, that some target sites are available to collection without overflight by the U-2.

Budget Issue No. 3: "Advanced Aircraft" R&D

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The program cost quoted includes, in our estimate, costs for a five-year operation, as well as the development and procurement of the 10 aircraft. It is possible that the vehicle would be a "new hypersonic aircraft", but this point is, indeed the subject of the study. Such a solution to the provision for a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance system would require expenditure of similar funds; however, other options may be surfaced which would require less funds. This determination is the intent of the study.

Any decision therefore should not address at this time the need for a hypersonic capability involving a large expenditure; rather, a discussion should confirm the necessity for performing a thorough study.

Budget Issue No. 3 (con't)

Comment 2, with respect to the inconsistency between consideration of such a system in light of OXCART phase-out and potential down-grading of SR-71 capability is not germane, inasmuch as the OXCART/SR-71 do not provide a survivable, quick reaction capability over the Soviet Union.

While at this time, we cannot forecast unequivocally that the technology should be pursued in FY-70, [] would be a minimum level, if the hypersonic system were to be selected as the only viable option.

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COMMENTS ON THE NRP FY 1970 BUDGET ESTIMATE
PAPER FOR THE NOV. EXCOM MEETING

The overall premise of the paper seems to be that the U2R and U2C/G are basically similar aircraft, neither user would agree with this premise. They are dissimilar as apples and oranges - aside from their outward appearances, they are totally different aircraft with totally different FAKs, pilot protection assemblies, electrical systems, etc. Fuel and hydraulic fluid excluded, there is very little else that can be commonly used between the two aircraft.

The paper further bases part of its justification for aircraft assignment on "operational flying hours". Considering the difference in definition of operational flying hours, i. e. the missions of the users, this should not be a consideration in the comparison. What for example is more valuable and more difficult to obtain for the U. S. Intelligence Community? One hour of operational flying over Kunming and Nanning China or one hour of operational flying over South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Regarding Para 8 of this paper, the Agency can with a minimum of 6 U2Rs meet its stated minimum requirement that called for 9 of the U2C/G aircraft.

A review of the Aircraft attrition as applied to FY 70 Budget issue #1 "U-2 Aircraft Program Options" has been found to be in error. The NRO has applied a three (3) U-2R aircraft loss prior to FY 1970. This is not realistic and the OSA forecast is for one (1) U-2R loss from the fleet of 12 during FY-1969.

This attrition factor as applied, does not alter the forecast dollar requirements for option 3 since the requirements for a 12 aircraft total will remain within a reasonable dollar difference. The significant point in this attrition factor is that both units can plan on a greater combat potential with forecast 11 U-2R rather than 9 U-2Rs.

There are no major discrepancies to the D/NRO recommended funding compared to what OSA had requested. It is suggested that this not be an issue for discussions since there will be another opportunity to submit a detailed FY 1970 Recommendation during June of 1969. The NRO has been very receptive during the past years for supporting additional requests during the fiscal year.